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Abstract—Robot Operating System (ROS) is becoming more
and more important and is used widely by developers and
researchers in various domains. One of the most important
fields where it is being used is the self-driving cars industry.
However, this framework is far from being totally secure, and
the existing security breaches do not have robust solutions.
In this paper we focus on the camera vulnerabilities, as it is
often the most important source for the environment discovery
and the decision-making process. We propose an unsupervised
anomaly detection tool for detecting suspicious frames incoming
from camera flows. Our solution is based on spatio-temporal
autoencoders used to truthfully reconstruct the camera frames
and detect abnormal ones by measuring the difference with the
input. We test our approach on a real-word dataset, i.e. flows
coming from embedded cameras of self-driving cars. Our solution
outperforms the existing works on different scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most roboticists nowadays are using the Robot Operating
System (ROS) [1] for the development of robot applications.
It is used in a multitude of real world settings, including
military projects and commercial robots [2]. It is also being
used for self-driving cars development [3]. However, it is still
vulnerable from the security aspect. Recent studies have shown
many flaws in ROS [4] that can lead to irreversible damages
if used with safety critical applications. A self-driving car is a
good example for this, where an abrupt change in the trajectory
could endanger the safety of the passengers and pedestrians.
A. Problem statement
ROS is based on a publisher-subscriber architecture. It is
composed of nodes (e.g. camera, processing) that communi-
cate through data publication into corresponding topics (e.g.
images) by publisher nodes (e.g. camera). This data can be
used by subscriber nodes (e.g. processing node). Any node
can subscribe to any topic within an application in order to
receive all the data that is published in it. Practically, there
is no protection for nodes communication, which allows at-
tackers to realize various scenarios; from learning confidential
information, to injecting, modifying, and replaying packets.
For instance, the attacker can play the Man-In-The-Middle
role between the camera node and processing node, and is
able to alter images or inject fake ones in order to induce a
misrecognition of objects by the processing node.
Given a sequence of timestamped images, the problem is
to detect, in real time, the abnormal images injected by an
attacker over a streaming flow.
B. Related works
Autonomous cars with ROS: In [5], the authors addressed
the autonomous cars application of ROS, and provided a se-
curity assessment. They presented an attack detection solution
based on images similarity, which could detect some attack
scenarios.
Autonomous systems with ROS : In [6], the authors
assessed the security flaws of ROS regarding nodes commu-
nication for autonomous systems. They presented a solution
based on cypher encryption that provides promising results.
In [7], the authors discovered vulnerabilities and attacks
against commercial humanoid robots running on ROS. They
highlighted a relevant number of security flaws that can be
used to take over the robot. In [8], the authors assessed
the security of autonomous vehicules and presented several
attacks that target the steering, braking, and acceleration of the
vehicule, but also attacks against the computer vision system.
C. Contribution
To the best of our knowledge, very few works have targeted
the vulnerabilities of ROS applied to self-driving cars, and the
existing solutions do not offer optimal performances. Thus,
we address in our paper the specific vulnerabilities related to
the robot’s camera, taking the case of an autonomous vehicle.
We present a novel method for real-time anomaly detection
on camera flows, which can be embedded directly on the
car’s system. Our solution is based on autoencoders used in
an unsupervised way to reconstruct the camera flows. The
experimental results are obtained on a previously published
dataset [5]. We show that our solution outperforms existing
works.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes
adversarial models of attacks we consider when designing
intrusion detection systems for cameras using ROS. Section III
describes our intrusion detection system. Section IV describes
the experiments and Section V concludes the paper.
Fig. 1: Attack model on ROS camera node.
Scenario ID Perturbation (attack) Image
1 Insertion of a black image 6
2 Insertion of a white image 6
3 Blurred image 6
4 Image from the past 6
5 Successive same images [4,8]
6 Flooding black images [4,8]
7 Blurred image (a little blur) 6
8 Modified image (Adding a black rectangle) 6
9 Modified image (Adding a black rectangle on
the traffic lights)
6
10 Modified image (replacing a red color by a green
color in the traffic lights)
6
TABLE I: Description of the attack scenarios with their
corresponding images.
II. ADVERSARIAL MODELS
Based on the vulnerabilities of ROS and the attacker model
highlighted in [5] and [9], a number of attacks against the
embedded camera of self-driving cars is defined in Fig. 1.
The attacker creates a fake node in order to intercept, inject,
or modify communications between the camera and the image
processing nodes (ex : pedestrian detection node).
The proposed attack scenarios are described in Table I.
Fig. 2 illustrates the different attacks applied on frames
extracted from the embedded camera. Each line represents
a series of frames over time, and contains perturbations
following the attack scenarios proposed in Table I. In each
scenario, the attack is represented by the 6th image, except
for the 5th and 6th scenarios where the attacks are composed
of several frames (from the 4th frame to the 8th frame).
The types of perturbed images (i.e. attacks) are:
• Insertion of an image: the attacker injects a fake image
(white, black or an image from the past) in the image
stream like in scenarios 1, 2, and 4.
• Blurred image: an image is altered by the attacker with
an intense blur in scenario 3 and small one in scenario 7.
• Flooding images: an injection of multiple and successive
images are injected in order to flood a processing node
of images. Scenario 5 and 6 present flooding images, and
flooding black images, respectively.
• Sophisticated attacks: they consist in adding small pertur-
bations like forms on objects such as traffic lights. The
goal of this attack is the misclassification or misrecogni-
tion of objects. The attacks can be: hiding a car (Fig. 3.a),
hiding traffic lights (Fig. 3.b) or changing the color of the
traffic lights by replacing the red light with a green one
(Fig. 3.c).
From these scenarios, we show that the attacker can change
data using low-cost techniques and thus cause misclassifica-
tion. In the next section, we present our solution for detecting
suspicious images in order to protect the camera system in a
self-driving car.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
We propose, as illustrated in Fig.4, a solution to analyze
video flows coming from ROS-enabled cars in order to detect
attacks in real-time using autoencoders.
A. Autoencoders
Autoencoders [10] are a special type of Neural Networks
used for reconstruction purposes. The principle is to train the
model by taking an input x, and given an output objective y
which is identical to the input (i.e : x = y), the goal is to
reconstruct the input as similarly as possible by minimizing
the difference between both. It is composed of two parts, an
encoder, which takes the input x and encodes it to match a
learned representation z, called latent variable, and a decoder
that tries to decode the representation to come up with the
original input.
The most important work done by an autoencoder, is to
perform a dimensionality reduction, while keeping the most
important information which allows a nearly lossless recon-
struction, or at least, a minimal loss [11].
We use autoencoders for anomaly detection by feeding
images as input to the model, so that it can learn the rep-
resentation and reproduce them accurately. Then, if the input
data is replaced by new data, different from the previous one,
the model will map it differently in the latent space, and thus,
reconstruct it differently.
B. Solution
Our solution is composed of two different parts: reconstruc-
tion and prediction. The reconstruction part is to reconstruct
truthfully the images given in the input, taking into account
the previous images. The prediction part consists on predicting
the future image, given the present image, and the previous
ones.
On a technical level, the proposed autoencoder is composed
of two parts. The encoder part, which takes a sequence of pre-
processed images, in form of time-series chunks, and encodes
them in the latent space by passing them through several neural
layers. Then, the decoder part takes the information from the
bottleneck and proceeds to dimensionality augmentation to
match the input’s dimension.
We extract the spatial characteristics using two dimensional
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Fig. 2: Example of targeted attacks on a camera embedded on a self-driving car [5].
(a) A black rectangle
hiding a car
(b) A black rectan-
gle hiding the traffic
lights
(c) A change of a
color in the traffic
lights (replacing red
by green)
Fig. 3: Sophisticated perturbations on images [5].
extract the temporal patterns using Recurrent Neural Network
(RNN) cells. The type of RNN cells that we used is called
Conv-LSTM [12]. In addition to the advantage offered by
the standard LSTM over the RNN [13], in terms of solving
the vanishing/exploding gradient problems and the long-term
memory capacities, this type of cells is based on convolutions.
Matrix multiplication is replaced by the Conv-LSTM with
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Fig. 4: Schema of the proposed solution.
convolution operation at each gate in the LSTM cell. It
captures spatial features by convolution operations in multiple-
dimensional data.
C. Present image reconstruction
The principle of the reconstruction is to give the expected
output as being the same as the input. So, when we start
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Fig. 5: Combined solution.
training the model, we define the target image as being the
same as the one given in the input. Thus, after each epoch,
the weights will be calculated through back propagation in
order to produce an output that matches the input. On the
side, the loss can be calculated with different methods, and
we will present some of them in the experiment part.
D. Future image prediction
The architecture used for future frame prediction is similar
to the reconstruction one. However, the training process is
different; Instead of training the autoencoder to reconstruct
the present image (time = t), it predicts the next incoming
frame, given the present frame (time = t) as an input and the
frame (time = t+ 1) as a target.
E. Combined solution
The attack scenarios are various and have different charac-
teristics. In order to maximize the detection, we decided to
combine both the reconstruction and the prediction (Fig. 5).
In order to detect attacks, we use the regularity scores. They
represent the result of the similarity measures between the
input and output obtained after applying error functions that
we will introduce in Section IV. By passing each sequence of
frames through both models, we obtain two regularity scores
for each scenario. We evaluate both of them and consider
the existence of an attack if it is detected by either one of
the two scores. We can consider it as two successive attack
checkpoints. Some attacks can pass through one model without
being detected, but passing through both models has a smaller
probability to happen.
Some cases can easily be detected with reconstruction, if
we take for example the case of frame injection such as
black/white frames. Some others are more complicated and are
harder to detect, like injecting images from the past. Applying
this combination improves the regularity scores and gives
better precision. We decided to separate the reconstruction
and prediction models in order to have two independent latent
spaces built and optimized for their respective purposes.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Experimental setup
The experiments were conducted on machines running
Ubuntu systems version "14.04.5 LTS : Trusty Tahr". It
integrates an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2609 v3 with a base
frequency of 1.90GHz. It has a RAM DDR memory of 128GB
and two Nvidia Tesla K80 of 12GB each as a GPU. All the
programming part was done using Python 3.6 with Tensorflow
version 1.9.0 as a backend.
B. Dataset
We use a publicly available dataset of real-world driving
data provided by Udacity 1. The self-driving-car data from
ROS are in ROSBAG file format. ROSBAG records all data
incoming from different sensors. For our experiments, we
extract videos from a camera.
The video contains more than 15000 frames. For the ground-
truth, we construct different image perturbations. The images
include both abnormal and normal images. Thus, the dataset
contains 10 separate scenarios whose general characteristics
were described in Table I.
C. Model Parameters
Error function and regularity score: We used both Mean
Squared Error (MSE) and Structural Similarity Index (SSIM)
[14] to train and evaluate the model performance. Based on
Human Visual System (HVS), error visibility is correlated with
loss of quality. However, MSE does not always have a good
correlation with human perception. In other words, we can
have cases where we can clearly see the difference between
two images from a human vision perception, but MSE can give
low error rates, indicating a high similarity. For those cases,
SSIM proves to be a better technique.
Layers and dimensions: The number and types of layers
of the proposed model have been fixed empirically. We have
tested many combinations, varying the input dimension, the
number of convolutions applied, the number of LSTM cells,
and the number of Up/Down sampling, and according to the
training and test results, fixed the architecture and parameters
of the model. The goal being, finding the balance between
reducing the dimension to extract useful information, and
avoiding information loss due to too much reduction, while
maintaining optimal reconstruction results. The input dimen-
sion has been fixed to 128x128x1 which means a resolution
of 128x128 pixels with a unique channel. The reduction of
dimension is applied twice, to obtain a dimension of 32x32x8
when reaching the bottleneck.
Optimizers: We have experimented four different optimiz-
ers: Adam, Adadelta, Adagrad, and RMSProp. We experi-
mented each one with both the Mean squared error (MSE)
loss and the SSIM (Structural similarity) loss.
D. Results
Table II shows the obtained scores for each case. It clearly
depicts that both Adadelta and Adagrad are not well suited for
our dataset as they are not optimized for time dependant data.
However, the Adam optimizer has brought the lowest training
losses, almost similar to the RMSProp.
In most cases, MSE gave better results. The regularity
score is defined as being the same as the MSE score or the
complement of SSIM to 1 (1-SSIM score).
1https://github.com/udacity/self-driving-car











TABLE II: Image similarity scores with different optimizers.
We have tested our model on the 10 different attack sce-
narios described in Section II. Fig. 6 shows the results of the
regularity check with our reconstruction model of a partial
video containing the first 6 scenarios. This result was obtained
by using the mean squared error as it presented better results
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Fig. 6: Regularity scores (MSE) with the reconstruction model
(6 attacks)
The outliers in the regularity score are clear and easy to spot
with our model for these scenarios. Using simple thresh-hold
methods, even static ones, we can easily spot the attacks as




















Fig. 7: Regularity scores (MSE) with the prediction model
(advanced attacks)
For the remaining attack scenarios, the prediction model
proved to be more effective. It is shown in Fig. 7 that scenario
number 7 (Table I) presents a very low regularity score
and is considered as anomalous. The sophisticated attacks
require more advanced anomaly detection methods. A dynamic
threshold is required to detect these scenarios.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we present a solution for detecting abnormal
camera flows resulting from an attack on a ROS-enabled
self-driving car. Our method is based on spatio-temporal
autoencoders used to truthfully reconstruct the camera frames
and detect abnormal images by measuring the difference with
the input. The solution includes both Reconstruction and
Prediction techniques, and combines them to get better results
in anomalous image detection. Several attack scenarios are
presented. The different attacks are perturbations on camera
flows performed by an attacker in order to cause object
misrecognition when using machine learning algorithms. Our
experimental results on real data show the ability of our
method to detect several attack scenarios.
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